September 29th, 2026
By Tatiana Svetlova, partner at Svetlova LLP and composer
I grew up in Latvia (at that time part of the Soviet Union), and my grandparents were
teenage survivors of WWII. We were raised believing that peace, once won, would last
forever. Now the children of our generation live with wars raging on our continents, while the
constant fear of a Third World War hovers like a shadow over our minds. So I cannot help
but think about what can possibly end this chaos.
Any war starts with a conflict or an argument. There is a saying that there are two sides to
any conflict. I would propose that there are three: each party’s own story, and then a third
version – a factual, level-headed account, which can only be narrated after the event by
someone who is not party to the conflict. In disputes involving individuals or companies, the
courts often play this role.
When it comes to wars between states – particularly where other countries become involved
– unfortunately there is no forum that can intervene as effectively as a court. In this article, I
will look at the war between Russia and Ukraine in its historical and geopolitical context and
offer a solution. After all, we are all thinking about it in one way or another.
Wars begin before the first battle
Every war is ultimately the eruption of an unresolved conflict. Unless we understand what
produced it, what sustains it and why earlier settlements failed, we cannot know what a
durable peace must address.
We usually date a war from the moment armies cross a border or a ruler declares hostilities.
That date is useful for chronology, but it can conceal the history that made violence possible.
To understand how a war might end, we must first identify the unresolved questions that
preceded it: territory, sovereignty, security, legitimacy and the balance of power.
This is the anatomy of war. An immediate trigger activates tensions that have accumulated
over years or generations. Fighting then creates its own interests, fears and grievances. A
truce may stop the shooting without settling the underlying dispute. If the political settlement
lacks legitimacy or credible enforcement, the pause becomes an interval before the next
campaign.
I have always been fascinated by the collapse of societies, and by the loss of progress that
follows – whether of the Classic Maya, Angkor or the Roman Empire (the remnants of which
we can still see everywhere in Europe).
Western Rome, of course, provides the clearest European example. In parts of the former
empire, especially Britain, the end of imperial government removed the fiscal, monetary and
administrative system that supported towns, professional armies and public works. A Roman
citizen could enter a heated bath complex supplied by engineered water systems. Several
generations later, living conditions had become far more primitive and the economy had
shrunk dramatically. It is a stark warning for us today.
Collapse often begins with division among ruling elites. If we look at Europe and the United
States now, they appear to be on a shaky road towards civil unrest. Political leaders publicly
mock each other, each new leader insults and diminishes the work of the predecessor (of
course, political rivalry is an old tale), and ruling leaders show off their military capabilities,
forgetting that warmongering breeds more war and unrest, and could trigger a nuclear
emergency.
A state may still appear formidable while its ruling class dismantles its capacity from within.
Peace or justice?
The daily loss of human life is what should drive the peace process. In view of this real aim –
putting an end to deaths and destruction – both states need to find a realistic balance
between justice and peace. This must also be the starting point for the “peace brokers”,
whoever they turn out to be.
Absolute justice for one side may look like total defeat to the other. This does not mean
abandoning accountability, but deciding which matters must be settled immediately and
which can be addressed through later courts, commissions, reparations or political
processes.
Apart from the devastating loss of human life on both sides, war also creates a fiscal trap.
Since February 2022, the United Kingdom has committed £16 billion in military support to
Ukraine, including £3.75 billion for 2026. The EU and its member states place their
combined military support at approximately €93 billion, while the United States had
committed more than $67.8 billion in defence equipment and services by March 2026. In
total, this comes to approximately £147 billion ($195 billion).
This support must also be considered against the financial position of those providing it. The
United Kingdom carries public debt of approximately £2.91 trillion and an annual budget
deficit of £132 billion; the EU’s member states collectively owe around €15.37 trillion and
record an annual deficit of €576.5 billion; while US national debt stands at approximately
$37.64 trillion, with an annual deficit of $1.78 trillion. Together, their debts amount to roughly
€52 trillion. Against this background, the approximately €171 billion committed in military
support to Ukraine raises an unavoidable question: can we continue to afford aid on this
scale, particularly when further military escalation appears unlikely to bring the war to an
end?
Supporting Ukraine’s security remains important, but lasting peace will ultimately require
diplomacy and negotiation, rather than an indefinite expansion of the conflict.
The financial consequences of the war extend far beyond the military assistance already
provided. The latest joint assessment by the World Bank, the European Commission, the
United Nations and the Ukrainian government (the Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs
Assessment, published on 23 February 2026) estimates that rebuilding and restoring
Ukraine will require almost $588 billion—more than €500 billion, or approximately £444
billion—over the next decade.
Direct physical damage already exceeds $195 billion, with transport, energy and housing
bearing the greatest losses. As the fighting continues, so does the destruction, meaning that
every further period of escalation adds not only to the human cost, but also to a
reconstruction bill that the international community will eventually be expected to help meet.
The question is whether Europe or the United States can really sustain this fight, and to what
end. Wouldn’t it be better for all parties to concentrate their energy and resources on peace?
I believe so.
Resolving the war
So let’s examine the principal causes of this particular war, since a problem cannot be
solved without first looking calmly at its roots. The main issues can be narrowed down to the
following:
• NATO enlargement and Ukraine’s closer alignment with the West.
• Russia’s annexation of Crimea and disagreement over its future status.
• Control and political status of Donetsk and Luhansk.
• Ukraine’s sovereignty and right to determine its own foreign policy.
• Security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia.
The failure of the Minsk agreements and the breakdown of diplomacy.
There are, put simply, three ways to end the war (of course, there are many nuances):
1. 2. 3. Military victory or surrender – one side defeats the other and imposes the outcome.
Negotiated settlement – the parties reach a compromise through diplomacy, usually
because neither can achieve an acceptable victory.
Ceasefire or frozen conflict – active fighting stops, but the underlying territorial or
political dispute remains unresolved.
Since the 17th century, I have counted nine wars that lasted over 30 years – and, earlier still,
England and France fought the Hundred Years’ War. The human “potential” to wage war is
not to be taken lightly.
There will not be a victory or surrender in the foreseeable future. We know that. A ceasefire
or frozen conflict alone would leave people living in poor conditions and the world in
perpetual uncertainty.
Negotiated settlement: a peace proposal
So the only viable option is a negotiated settlement. Both states need to accept,
philosophically and pragmatically, that total victory is impossible and cannot be demanded
by either party.
If we work backwards (from the Minsk agreements, the closest thing to a peace settlement
that has existed), first and foremost, the warring parties need a mediator that supports
neither side. How can the UK, France or indeed the US broker peace when they have skin in
the game, having supplied weapons and ammunition and participated indirectly since the
outset of the war?
There is no perfect answer. The most realistic arrangement may be a small mediation group,
perhaps consisting of India; the UAE or Saudi Arabia as host; Brazil, representing the wider
Global South; and the United Nations, providing institutional and humanitarian support.
Turkey remains a good place to conduct the negotiations.
A ceasefire and a lawful political process
I therefore propose an immediate, internationally monitored ceasefire. A ceasefire should not
be treated as recognition of territorial conquest or as a final settlement. Its first purpose
would be to stop deaths, reduce the danger of direct confrontation between Russia and
NATO, and create protected space for negotiation, humanitarian return and enforceable
security arrangements.
The future of genuinely disputed territories would then require an agreed political process. If
referendums form part of that settlement, they must be created by an agreement accepted
by Ukraine and Russia and supported by an international mandate. Votes organised by an
occupying power during hostilities cannot provide a lawful or credible answer.
Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk would each hold a lawful referendum. A credible vote would
require demilitarisation or an agreed neutral security presence, an independent electoral
commission, free campaigning, balanced media access, secret ballots, transparent counting
and international observation. The electorate must include displaced residents and refugees
while excluding the effect of coerced or unlawful population transfers. The parties would
have to agree in advance which territories vote, which choices appear on the ballot, what
legal consequences follow and how minorities will be protected.
If the people in these areas choose Ukraine, Russia will have no legal or military grounds to
claim them, and the reverse also applies.
NATO bases in Ukraine will never be an option for Russia, just as Russian bases in Cuba or
Mexico would be an instant security threat to the US. Many senior Western diplomats took
this view long ago, and this needs to be at the forefront of any peace talks.
Future funding from the EU, the US and other countries, together with a substantial
redevelopment grant from Russia as the state that commenced the aggression, should be
applied to rebuild Ukraine. All funds must be monitored by an international committee to
prevent corruption.
The danger for modern Europe
Modern society is more technologically advanced than ancient Rome, but it is also
dependent on continuous electricity, digital communications, global logistics, finance, water
treatment and specialised supply chains. A major European or nuclear war would not need
to erase scientific knowledge to reduce living standards. It would only need to interrupt the
systems that place food in shops, power in hospitals, fuel in transport and reliable
information in the hands of government.
These foundations can deteriorate much faster than they were built. It makes me uneasy to
see EU governments preparing for war, to see fighter jets over Europe almost daily and to
hear on Newsnight that it would be sensible for households in the UK to have rations and
tinned food ready to last four to five days. We need only to remember that this particular war
was expected to last three to four days.
My assessment is that Russia’s population, industrial base, geographic proximity and
capacity to sustain a long war give it substantial advantages in a prolonged war of attrition.
Western assistance can strengthen Ukraine’s defence and negotiating position. It also
carries costs and escalation risks. It would be too categorical to present a Russian victory as
certain, because victory depends on its definition, political endurance, economic conditions
and the terms on which the war ends. It is nevertheless dangerous to test Russia’s
advantages indefinitely without a defined political end state.
A Third World War would not remain an argument conducted by governments at a safe
distance. Its effects would reach ordinary people through energy shortages, interrupted
medicine and food supplies, displaced populations, financial disorder and damaged
infrastructure. The risk concerns everyone, including those far from the present front line.
No historical analogy supplies a simple formula for Ukraine. Medieval dynastic claims are
not equivalent to the sovereign equality protected by the United Nations Charter, and the
Hundred Years War does not prove that the larger power must win. It does show that military
assistance, battlefield success and diplomacy must be measured against a defined political
end state. A ceasefire without an agreed structure may become another pause before
renewed war.
History repeats itself when societies remember the final invasion, but ignore the long
deterioration that made it decisive. The practical protection against collapse is a legitimate
and competent state, functioning public services, maintained infrastructure and leaders
willing to compromise before shocks become irreversible. Peace is part of that resilience
because prolonged war consumes the very institutions required for recovery.
There is also the question of leadership. President Zelensky’s five-year term would ordinarily
have ended in May 2024. Elections have been deferred under martial law, as Ukraine’s
constitution requires, but his legitimacy has been openly questioned by Moscow and, at
times, by President Trump. Whatever view one takes of that dispute, a settlement of this
complexity calls for a leader with deep diplomatic experience and a mandate that neither
side can challenge. In my view, President Zelensky, who came to office with no background
in government or diplomacy, is not best placed to deliver it. A peace process may be better
served by his stepping aside, or at least by fresh elections as soon as a ceasefire allows
them to be held safely.
Below I set out a short summary of the conflict for those who wish to refresh their memory.
Brief history of the Russia–Ukraine conflict
Russia’s full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, but it followed years of growing
confrontation. Ukraine became independent in 1991 within internationally recognised
borders and surrendered its inherited nuclear arsenal under the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum. NATO’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine would eventually become a member
intensified Russian security concerns, although it did not begin the armed conflict.
War began in 2014 with Russia’s seizure and purported annexation of Crimea and the
subsequent fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk. The Minsk agreements failed, largely because
Ukraine prioritised security and restoration of border control while Russia insisted that
elections and political status should come first. The 2022 invasion transformed this
unresolved conflict into a major European war.
Negotiations began shortly after the invasion. At Istanbul in March 2022, Ukraine proposed
neutrality and non-nuclear status in return for international security guarantees, while
preserving the possibility of European Union membership. This created a genuine
negotiating framework, but not a completed peace agreement. Territory, Crimea and
Donbas, restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces and the enforcement of security guarantees
remained unresolved. The discovery of killings in Bucha further damaged any remaining
trust.
Boris Johnson visited Kyiv on 9 April 2022, and later accounts have produced considerable
speculation about his role. Some Ukrainian sources reported that he encouraged continued
resistance and indicated that Western governments were not prepared to support the
proposed guarantees. However, the available evidence does not establish that Johnson
determined Ukraine’s decision or prevented an agreed treaty. The negotiations were already
burdened by unresolved territorial, constitutional and security questions. The most that can
responsibly be said is that the wider Western position formed part of Ukraine’s assessment
of whether negotiations offered a credible and enforceable peace.
